Perception de l'action prédictive à partir d'informations d'intention explicites dans l'autisme

Aperçu: G.M.

Les difficultés sociales dans les "troubles du spectre de l'autisme" (TSA) peuvent provenir d'une modulation descendante réduite des informations sensorielles qui empêche l'attribution spontanée d'intentions au comportement observé.
Cependant, bien que les personnes autistes soient capables de raisonner explicitement sur les états mentaux des autres, l'effet des informations d'intention abstraite sur les processus perceptifs n'a pas été testé.
Les participants TSA (n = 23) et un groupe témoin neurotypique (NT) (n = 23) ont observé une main soit en train d'atteindre un objet, soit de s'en retirer. Avant le début de l'action, le participant a soit demandé à l'acteur de "Prendre" ou "Laissez-le", ou a entendu l'acteur dire "Je vais le prendre" ou "Je vais le laisser", ce qui a fourni une intention explicite qui était tout aussi susceptible d'être congruente ou incohérente avec l'action ultérieure. La main a disparu avant la fin de l'action, et les participants ont signalé la dernière position vue du bout de l'index en touchant l'écran.
Les participants NT ont montré un biais prédictif en réponse à la direction de l'action (atteint perçu plus près de l'objet, retraits perçus plus loin), et en réponse à la connaissance préalable des intentions de l'acteur (plus près de l'objet après "Take it", plus loin après "Leave it ").
Cependant, les participants TSA ont présenté un biais de perception prédictif uniquement en réponse aux intentions explicites, mais pas en réponse au mouvement de l'action elle-même.
La perception des TSA n'est pas à l'abri de la modulation descendante. Cependant, les informations doivent être présentées explicitement indépendamment du stimulus lui-même, et non pas déduites d'indices inhérents au stimulus. 

. 2021 May 23. doi: 10.3758/s13423-021-01941-w. 

Predictive action perception from explicit intention information in autism

Matthew Hudson  ^{1   2} , Toby Nicholson  ³ , Anna Kharko  ³ , Rebecca McKenzie  ³ , Patric Bach  ^{3   4}

Affiliations

• PMID: 34027620
• DOI: 10.3758/s13423-021-01941-w

Abstract

Social difficulties in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) may originate from a reduced top-down modulation of sensory information that prevents the spontaneous attribution of intentions to observed behaviour. However, although people with autism are able to explicitly reason about others' mental states, the effect of abstract intention information on perceptual processes has remained untested. ASD participants (n = 23) and a neurotypical (NT) control group (n = 23) observed a hand either reaching for an object or withdrawing from it. Prior to action onset, the participant either instructed the actor to "Take it" or "Leave it", or heard the actor state "I'll take it" or "I'll leave it", which provided an explicit intention that was equally likely to be congruent or incongruent with the subsequent action. The hand disappeared before completion of the action, and participants reported the last seen position of the tip of the index finger by touching the screen. NT participants exhibited a predictive bias in response to action direction (reaches perceived nearer the object, withdrawals perceived farther away), and in response to prior knowledge of the actor's intentions (nearer the object after "Take it", farther away after "Leave it"). However, ASD participants exhibited a predictive perceptual bias only in response to the explicit intentions, but not in response to the motion of the action itself. Perception in ASD is not immune from top-down modulation. However, the information must be explicitly presented independently from the stimulus itself, and not inferred from cues inherent in the stimulus.

Keywords: Action prediction; Autism spectrum disorder; Implicit/explicit mentalizing; Predictive coding; Representational momentum.

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Corrélations neuronales du traitement implicite et explicite de l'émotion faciale dans le TSA

Traduction:  G.M.

J Autism Dev Disord. 2017 May 11. doi: 10.1007/s10803-017-3141-1.

Neural Correlates of Explicit Versus Implicit Facial Emotion Processing in ASD

Luckhardt C¹, Kröger A², Cholemkery H², Bender S^2,3, Freitag CM².

Author information

1

Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy, Autism Research and Intervention Center of Excellence, University Hospital Frankfurt, Goethe University, Deutschordenstraße 50, 60528, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Christina.Luckhardt@kgu.de.

2

Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy, Autism Research and Intervention Center of Excellence, University Hospital Frankfurt, Goethe University, Deutschordenstraße 50, 60528, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

3

Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy, Medical Faculty, University of Cologne, Robert-Koch-Straße 10, 50931, Cologne, Germany.

Abstract

Les mécanismes nerveux sous-jacents de la reconnaissance implicite et explicite de l'émotion faciale (FER) ont été étudiés chez les enfants et les adolescents avec un diagnostic de trouble du spectre de l'autisme (TSA) par rapport aux témoins au développement typique (TDC). L'EEG a été obtenu à partir de N = 21 TSA et N = 16 TDC. La performance de la tâche, les potentiels évoqués visuels (P100, N170) et cognitifs (potentiel positif ), ainsi que la cohérence ont été comparés entre les groupes. Le groupe TDC a montré une augmentation dépendant de la tâche et une latéralisation plus forte de l'amplitude P100 au cours de la tâche explicite et de la modulation dépendante des tâches de la cohérence intra-hémisphérique dans la bande bêta. En revanche, le groupe TSA n'a montré aucune modulation dépendant de la tâche. Les résultats indiquent des perturbations dans le traitement visuel précoce et les processus d'attention top-down comme facteurs contribuant aux déficits FER dans le TSA .
 The underlying neural mechanisms of implicit and explicit facial emotion recognition (FER) were studied in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) compared to matched typically developing controls (TDC). EEG was obtained from N = 21 ASD and N = 16 TDC. Task performance, visual (P100, N170) and cognitive (late positive potential) event-related-potentials, as well as coherence were compared across groups. TDC showed a task-dependent increase and a stronger lateralization of P100 amplitude during the explicit task and task-dependent modulation of intra-hemispheric coherence in the beta band. In contrast, the ASD group showed no task dependent modulation. Results indicate disruptions in early visual processing and top-down attentional processes as contributing factors to FER deficits in ASD.

PMID:28497246

DOI:10.1007/s10803-017-3141-1

La compréhension implicite et explicite de personnages ambigus par des adolescents présentant un trouble du spectre autistique.

Traduction : G.M.

ML Allen, A. Chambers

Université de Lancaster, Royaume-Uni.

Résumé

Les enfants atteints de troubles du spectre autistique (TSA) peuvent traiter les deux interprétations d'une figure ambiguë (par exemple, le lapin / canard)


quand on leur explique l'ambiguïté, mais ils n'ont pas tendance à ne pas le faire spontanément.

Dans notre étude, nous montrons que, bien que les adolescents atteints de TSA peuvent explicitement éprouver une telle expérience d'«inversions», les mesures implicites suggèrent qu'ils ont un traitement des images conceptuellement différent de celui de leurs pairs handicapés.

Les participants ont copié les mêmes figures ambiguës dans différentes conditions contextuelles, à la fois avant et après l'expérience d'inversion. Les résultats suggèrent que les adolescents atteints de TSA ne sont pas influencés par des informations contextuelles lors de la copie des dessins ambigus, car ils produisent des images similaires avant et après inversion, par rapport aux participants du groupe témoin.

Cette recherche a des implications pour la façon dont les individus atteints de TSA comprendre les représentations multiples et soutient la théorie du fonctionnement perceptuel amélioré
.